Abstract. The information society is ever-increasingly dependent upon Information Security Management Systems (ISMSs), and the availability of these systems has come to be vital to the evolution of SMEs. However, this type of companies requires ISMSs which have been adapted to their particular characteristics, and which are optimised from the point of view of the resources that are necessary to install and maintain them. This paper concentrates on the development of a process for ISMSs that will allow the level of security of critical applications installed in these sytems, i.e., Operative Systems and Data Base Management Systems, to be measured. This process is currently being directly applied in real cases, thus leading to an improvement in its application.
Introduction
It is extremely important for businesses to install security controls which will allow them to know and control the risks to which they may be subjected [1, 2] , since the installation of these controls supposes important improvements for these companies [3] . However, the mere installation of these controls is not sufficient, since long-term security management systems are also necessary if companies are to react to new risks, vulnerabilities, threats etc. in an agile manner [4, 5] . Nevertheless, companies frequently do not have security management systems, or if they do, the systems have been created without appropriate guidelines and documentation, and with insufficient resources [6] . What is more, the majority of the security tools available on the market help to solve certain security problems, but very few of them tackle the problem of security management in a global and integrated manner. In fact, the huge diversity of these tools and their lack of integration suppose tremendous costs in resourses if they are to be managed correctly.
Although it has been shown that for a business to be able to use information technologies and communications with guarentees it must have guidelines, metrics and tools at its disposal that will provide it with constant knowledge of its level of security and any vulnerabilities that have not yet been covered [7] , the level of successfully installed systems is extremely low. This problem is particularly accentuated in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises, which face the additional limitation of not having sufficient human and economic resources to be able to carry out appropriate management [6] .
According to recent research [8] , the success of ISMSs principally depends upon the following factors: i) focusing security on the business; ii) implementing security in accordance with the business's culture; iii) obtaining the business management's indisputable, visible and commited support; iv) enabling a good understanding of security requirements, evaluations and risk management; v) raising both the management's and the employees' awareness of the need for security; vi) offering training and guidelines on policies and regulations to the entire organisation; vii) defining a measurement system with which to evaluate the security management's output and suggest improvements. These factors are important in the case of SMEs, but the ISMSs in this type of companies must also be optimised with regard to the resources needed, and must be of a sufficient scope to ensure that security is not neglected, whilst not being so excessive as to be costly. It is therefore of great importance that SMEs have information security management methodologies which have been especially designed for this type of companies, and which also allow them to reuse previously acquired knowledge and experience, thus making their installation faster, more accurate and more economical.
In this paper we concentrate upon analysing a method which is oriented towards fulfilling the seventh of these factors -"defining a measurement system with which to evaluate the security management's output and suggest improvements", and this will be adapted to the case of SMEs in order to ensure that maintenance costs are greatly reduced, thus offering those resposible for security the maximum possible value, and allowing them to know the short-term fulfillment level of the various controls.
The paper continues in Section 2 in which the objectives pursued during this research are described. Section 3 describes the measurement process used. Section 4 analyses the control objectives created for the research phase it self. Section 5 presents the tool that supports the process defined and shows some of the results obtained. Finally, in Section 6 we show our concusions and future work.
Objectives pursued by this research
The aforementioned view of the current market situation and its security needs has been used as a starting point upon which to centre the objective of this research: the creation of a process that will permit the simple yet efficient measurement of the level of security in those applications that can be considered to be critical to the correct functioning of a company's Information System. A tool that will support this process and enable the automation of some of the tests to be carried out in the system, along with obtaintaining a final report on the state of security of its principal work applications has also been developed. This process will allow us to obtain a guarantee of the risk that is assumed with a business' Information System, with the lowest cost in both time and money, which will be extremely useful for SMEs.
This metric was created by bearing in mind the latest research concerning the most important standards related to security metrics [9, 10] . The mechanism created is not intended to substitute these regulations, but to complement them and to assist in their fulfilment.
The analysis of the process' initial control objectives has been centred on the following areas:
• Operative Systems. It is first necessary to verify that the Operative Systems have been updated with the manufacturer's latest versions and updatings. An analysis of the various versions of Operative Systems will allow any possible incompatibilities with other basic Software products and their specific versions that have been acquired by the installation to be discovered.
• Data Base Management Systems. The design of Data Bases has become a highly complex and sophisticated process. The process will analyse the existing data safeguard Systems, and review both their integrity, the consistency of the data stored in them and the absence of redundancies among them. We can therefore state that the principal objective of this research has been to create a process that will permit the definition of a series of measurable and evaluable aspects with regard to critical applications, along with a tool to support it which will allow us to provide an objective evaluation and an updated risk report of the Operative Systems and of the Data Base Management Systems (key elements in any company) with which they will be integrated and upon which the company's remaining applications are sustained. This process will be integrated into the other processes forming part of an ISMS.
The scope of the current research phase has been limited to: a) Developing all the control objectives at the level of the Operative System and DBMS; b) Developing a tool which will support the process and allow us to review the level of security fulfilled on the basis of the control objectives defined; c) Analysing which control objectives can be automated in the DBMS; and d) An evaluation of the process within the development and production environments of the Sicaman Company.
Four clearly defined phases were followed to attain the objective proposed in this research:
• During the 1st phase we analysed how to define a simple system that would allow us to evaluate the critical applications' current level of security.
• During the 2nd phase we extracted the tools selected for the research, which would be the principal factors evaluated in order to define the level of security. We then carried out an in-depth study of the Windows O.S., along with the two DBMS most frequently used at present (Oracle and SQL Server) in order to define the control objectives that would later allow us to carry out an evaluation of both the level of security and the evaluation system that would be used for the securitization of the environment.
• During the 3rd phase we created an application that would allow us to support the analysis of the process defined in the 1st phase. We were consequently able to provide an evaluation of of the security level in the systems analysed, according to their current configuration. Certain recommendations associated with the actions that should be taken to raise the Information Systems' security level were also obtained. This application consists of four parts: a) Parameter input for the analysis; b) Manual filling in of part of the checklist; c) Automatic scanning and filling in of part of the checklist; d) Issuing of the report.
• Finally, in the 4th phase, the process and the tool that supports the various systems that function in the Sicman Company were applied. The process allowed us to obtain a set of results with which to determine the current security level in this company's systems, and enabled us to provide recommendations on how to improve them.
Development of measurement process
The development of this phase involved making a prior selection of those tools and applications which, in the event of a security failure, would make most impact on the company's computer services. The results of this study showed that the company's greatest risk concerned the loss or undesired leaking of its data.
The results of this analysis led us to the conclusion that the critical applications in any computer system that functions under a Microsoft platform are the O.S. and the data support systems, and we therefore selected the following applications for the development of the project: Windows Operative Systems, Oracle Data Base Management Systems and SQL Server.
The following step in this phase was to determine what the control objectives were for each of the applications, along with determining tests and levels that would allow us to evaluate the system's current risk level.
These control objectives were developed by using the technical security documentation provided by the company's manufacturers, in addition to the personal experience of the human team which participated. This knowledge enabled us to select those points in each application that supposed the greatest risk. Each of these points was then dicretized to enable its quantification.
The quantification or evaluation mechanism of the control objectives is based solely upon the experts' knowledge of these applications, which implies that later versions of the application may experience variations.
The structure followed to define the control objectives was:
• Id: A unique code which allows the control objective and the application to which it belongs to be identified.
To what level the control objective is affected within the global environment.
• Question: The control objective pursued.
• Responsibility: The person responsible for applying this control objective.
• Instant: Determine at what instant the control objective should be tested.
• Action: Determine how the control objective should be verified.
• Correct configuration: What the control objective should be like if it is to be considered secure.
• Evaluation: Criteria to decide whether or not the control objective is fulfilled, thus establishing it as being safe or unsafe.
The execution of the process defined led us to obtain the application's security level, which can be calculated as: Table 1 . Equiation with which to calculate the fulfillment level of a control.
RL = (([TGVF]*100)/[TGPV]) SL = 100 -RL
• RL: Risk level.
• SL: Security level.
• TGVF: Total grading of vulnerabilities found.
• TGPV: Total grading of possible vulnerabilities.
The associated risk is obtained according to the value obtained, and is discretized in the following table: 
Definition of controls
In this research phase a detailed analysis has been made of the critical applications with the objective of extracting the set of control objectives for each of the applications forming part of the research. The following applications were analysed:
• Windows Server: A set of 25 controls were extracted for evaluation. The total number of points that will define the application's security varies between 0 (maximum security level) and 37 (minimum security level). Table 3 shows an example of the control defined for this type of application. The aspects to be evaluated are divided into 5 typologies: Question: Does a security copy of the contents of the Register exist?
Level: Management Gestión.
Responsibility: Administrator.
Instant: Operative.
Action: Register.
Correct configuracion: Keep an updated security copy of the Register.
Evaluation:
-Unsafe: There is no copy of the register, or it is not reviewed periodically.
-Safe: An updated security copy of the register exists, and it is reviewed periodically during predefined periods.
• SQL Server: A set of 37 controls were extracted whose security coverage was evaluated. Of these, 26 can be automated to reduce costs and 13 currently require manual analysis. The total number of points defining the security level of the application varies between 0 (maximum security level) and 53 (minimum security level). Level: Data Base.
Responsibility: Programmer.
Instant: General.
Action: Code control.
Correct configuration: Protect against access via SQL through the development of a structured programme.
Evaluation:
-Unsafe: Dependencies exist between DBs which are not contained in views.
-Safe: Views are used to minimize the dependencies between DBs.
Test requested: Analyse the dependencies with linked servers and verify the type of objects that they contain. Use the sysservers, sysobjects and syscomments tables for this.
Script for automation:
select srvname collate SQL_Latin1_General_CP1_CI_AS from master.dbo.sysservers declare @servidor varchar (128) select @servidor = '' select total, servidor_novista, servidor_vista, case when total=0 then 0 else 100*convert(decimal(9,2),servidor_novista)/convert(decimal(9,2),total) end as porc_servidor_novista, case when total=0 then 0 else 100*convert(decimal(9,2),servidor_vista)/convert(decimal(9,2),total) end as porc_servidor_vista from (select count(*) as total, isnull(sum(case when xtype='V' then 1 else 0 end),0) servidor_vista, isnull(sum(case when xtype='V' then 0 else 1 end),0) servidor_novista from sysobjects a, syscomments b where text like '%'+@servidor+'%') a
• Oracle: A set of 26 controls were extracted whose level of security coverage was evaluated. The total number of points that will define the application's level of security varies between 0 (maximum security level) and 44 (minimum security level). Question: Has the optimisation of the Shared Pool area been carried out?
Level: Data Base.
Responsibility: System administrator.
Instant: Creation and maintenance of applications: this can be encompassed in one action: "Service Account".
Action: Service Account.
Correct configuration: Guarantee the use of the memory zone to obtain a good performance of the applications. The machine is Oracle.
-Unsafe: If this structure is small, then contentions will be produced in the system, lowering its performance and response times.
-Safe: The size is adjusted to the application's needs.
Test requested: The SQL library cache and dictionary cache will be reviewed: in the first consultation, if the ratio obtained is less than 95%, this indicates that pagination is occuring and it will be necessary to raise the value of the SHARED_POOL_SIZE parameter of INIT.ORA. If the ratio of the second consultation is greater than 1%, this indicates that excessive faults are being produced in the library cache. In the last sentence, the RATIO obtained must have a correct answer rate close to 90%, otherwise excessive access faults will be produced.
Select (sum(pins-reloads))/sum(pins) * 100 "RATIO" From v$librarycache; Select sum(pins) " umber of Run", sum(reloads) " umber of failures in memory", sum (reloads)/(sum(pins)+sum(reloads))*100 "RATIO" From v$librarycache; Select (1-(sum(getmisses)/(sum(gets)+sum(getmisses))))*100 "RATIO" From v$rowcache;
Practical results
A tool has been created to provide the development process with automated support. The system tests have been carried out on the installations in the Sycman Company (SNT) on the development and production servers, the Windows Server and Oracle Data Base Management Systems and the SLQ Server operative systems. Table 6 shows some of the conclusions reached after applying the process defined to real applications. The application of the method defined to the SNT development and production environments led to the following results:
• The production server for the SQL Server 2005 environment obtained an evaluation for the "Windows 2003 Server" application of 10 out of 37, which implies a potential risk of 27.03% and a security level of 72.97%. • The development server for the Oracle 11i environment obtained an evaluation for the "SQL Server 2005" application of 25 out of 53, which implies a high risk of 47.17% and a security level of 52.83%.
• The development server for the Oracle 11i environment obtained an evaluation for the "Windows 2003 Server" application of 18 out of 37, which implies a high risk of 51.35% and a security level of 48.65%.
• The development server for the Oracle 11i environment obtained an evaluation for the "Oracle 11i" application of 21 out of 44, which implies a high risk of 47.73% and a security level of 52.27%.
The risk level obtained in the reviews is shown in The current level of security coverage for the applications analysed is shown in Table 8: The final conclusions obtained are: • The SNT production environment has an average security level, both at the server level and at the level of individual applications. It would be advisable to follow the recommendations obtained during the execution of the process in order to obtain secure processes, particularly if we bear in mind that this is a production environment.
• The SNT development environment has a low security level at the server level and at the level of individual applications in both the SQL Server and Oracle environments. In a development environment it is advisable for the risk to be at a medium level, and we therefore advise the company to follow the recommendations made in the audit report.
This paper presents a proposal for a process which is oriented towards measuring the level of security in critical applications that form part of an information system. We have defined how this process can be used and how it could assist SMEs to discover the risks that they may confront without the need to assume large costs.
The characteristics of this process and its orientation towards SMEs have been very well received, and its application is proving to be very positive since it allows this type of businesses to better understand the risks to which their information assets are subjected. This process allows allows companies to obtain short-term results, thus reducing the costs supposed by other analysis mechanisms and leading to greater company satisfaction.
We are currently analysing the possibility of integrating this process into the Security Management methodology for SMEs denominated as MMSM-SME [11] [12] [13] [14] , and into the tool that supports this methodology [15] .
Thanks to the development of this research project, the companies in which the results obtained have been tested have been able to identify security risks and improvable aspects in their systems.
In later versions of this application we shall continue the automation process of control objectives that commenced here.
Finally, we believe that the work carried out must be extended with new applications, new controls, and mechanisms that will permit the inclusion of an increasing amount of automated controls.
All future improvements to the process and the model will be oriented towards improving their levels of automation and precision, whilst always respecting the principle of the cost of resources. In other words, we seek to improve the process without incurring generation and maintenance costs.
